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E¢ciency of joint enterprises
with internal bargaining
Abstract : In this paper we take a close look at those strategic incentives arising in
a situation where …rms share the costs and pro…ts in a multi-…rm project, and
bargain for their respective (precommitted) split of cost- and pro…t-shares. We
establish that, when each …rm’s e¤ort contribution to the joint undertaking is
mutually observable (which is often the case in closely collaborative operations)
and hence can form basis of the contingent cost- and pro…t-sharing scheme, it is not
the gross economic e¢ciency but the super-/sub-additivity of the nett returns from
e¤ort that directly a¤ects the sustainability of a pro…le of …rms’ e¤ort contributions.
The (in)e¢ciency result we obtain in this paper is of di¤erent nature from so-called
“free riding” or “team competition“ problems : the set of sustainable outcomes with
bargaining over precommetted cost- and pro…t-shares is generally neither a superset
nor a subset of the sustainable set without bargaining.
Keywords : cost sharing, pro…t sharing, repayment, subgame perfection.
JEL classi…cation : L13, G31, O32.
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1 Introduction
Cost sharing between multiple economic bodies, such as a research joint venture under-
taken by multiple …rms operating in the same industry, often tends to be encouraged from
policy- and welfare-points of view.1 Apparently, the leading reason for such “o¢cial”
encouragement is the assertion that cost sharing can enhance cost-e¢ciency, eliminating
otherwise wasteful e¤ort duplication. A relevant example is the possibility of carrying
out joint R&D activities in the development of new products and processes (see Katz,
1986; d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Katz and Ordover, 1990; Kamien et al., 1992;
Suzumura, 1992). On the other hand it is well noted that, generally, each participant in
any joint project has an incentive to “free ride” the e¤ort exerted by other participants,
which tends to entail an ine¢cient outcome with a suboptimally low level of e¤ort chosen
strategically by each participant.
Perhaps one of the most natural and the most spontaneous “solution” to this incentive
problem is to allow …rms to make their cost- and pro…t-shares in the joint project directly
contingent upon their exerted e¤ort levels. In a joint project where participating …rms
closely collaborate with one another, it is often not at all unrealistic to assume that they
can accurately monitor each other’s e¤ort levels. In this paper we model such a situation
by a simple two-stage game where each …rm decides its own e¤ort investment in the
…rst stage, followed by the realisation of their respective nett pro…t shares in the ensuing
stage. By precommitting their nett pro…t shares before deciding their respective e¤ort
investment, …rms can reward or punish each other’s e¤ort decisions and thereby enforce
a certain pro…le of e¤ort investment even if their decisions (in the …rst stage of the game)
are simultaneously and noncooperatively made.
Our main …nding in this paper is that, even though the aforementioned contingent
pro…t-sharing scheme serves as a means to circumvent the classical free riding problem, it
can harbour a di¤erent kind of ine¢ciency. The gist of the di¤erence between preceding
studies and our model is not the mere fact that …rms can precommit with their nett pro…t
shares and monitor each other’s e¤ort, but that there can be room for bargaining among
…rms when they predetermine their nett pro…t shares. Essentially, each …rm’s bargaining
1See the National Cooperative Research Act in the US ; EC Commission (1990) ; and Goto and
Wakasugi (1988), inter alia.
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power is closely related to its “outside alternative” which, in a game-theoretic context,
is largely parallel to the …rm’s unilateral deviation incentives. This inevitably implies
that an outcome which is not susceptible to strong unilateral deviation incentives by any
of the participating …rms, can be sustained as a (subgame perfect) equilibrium whether
economically e¢cient or not.
To summarise, if each …rm’s cost share is determined independently of their respective
contributions, it tends to entail the classical free riding problem. Alternatively, if pro…t
sharing can be made contingent upon each …rms’ strategic contribution decisions, then
the bargaining between participating …rms tends to give rise to multiple equilibria, among
which the e¤ort levels are complementary between …rms (i.e., the locus of equilibria is
downward-sloping) if nett joint returns to e¤ort is submodular between …rms ; or comple-
mentary between …rms (i.e., the locus of equilibria is upward-sloping) if nett joint returns
to e¤ort is submodular.
The basic structure of our model, together with its general qualitative feature, is laid
out in section 2. We present illustrative examples in section 3 to develop intuition on how
precommitted bargaining can a¤ect the sustainability of economically e¢cient outcomes.
Section 4 concludes the paper. A glimpse of extension to a more quantitative decisions
made by each of the participating …rms in a joint project, is given in Appendix B.
2 Basic model
We start our analysis from a simple model of cost- and pro…t-sharing between two economic
bodies, referred to as “…rm 1” and “…rm 2” henceforth. Although these two “…rms” are to
launch a jointly undertaken project, each of them is to decide, simultaneously and nonco-
operatively, whether or not to make an incremental marginal contribution to the joint
project. The nett joint returns from their decisions can be summarised in the following
table.
…rm 2 contribute not contribute
…rm 1 contribute Y [1; 1] Y [1; 0]
not contribute Y [0; 1] Y [0; 0]
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Throughout the paper we assume that contributions are mutually observable, so that
…rms can make their shares of nett pro…ts y1[K] and y2[K] contingent directly upon the
pro…le of their contributions subject, obviously, to
y1[K] + y2[K] = Y [K] [K] 2 f[1; 1]; [1; 0]; [0; 1]; [0; 0]g :
Hence, the procedural structure of this game can be summarised by the tree in …gure 1.
Figure 1 : cost/pro…t sharing contingent upon contributions.
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At the beginning, the two …rms bargain2 for the complete contingent set of nett pro…t
shares. To retain as much generality as possible we avoid narrowly specifying the procedure
of bargaining, other than imposing the following weak regularity requirement which seems
plausible in any standard economic sense.
De…nition : A bargaining function b[¢; ¢; ¢] = (b1[¢; ¢; ¢]; b2[¢; ¢; ¢]) where
y1[k1; k2] = b1 [y1[:k1; k2]; y2[k1;:k2]; Y [k1; k2]]
y2[k1; k2] = b2 [y1[:k1; k2]; y2[k1;:k2]; Y [k1; k2]]
fk1;:k1g = fk2;:k2g = f0; 1g
is said to be regular if
² b1 increases in y1[:k1; k2] , decreases in y2[k1;:k2] , and increases in Y [k1; k2] ;
² b2 decreases in y1[:k1; k2] , increases in y2[k1;:k2] , and increases in Y [k1; k2] ;
² b1 = y1[:k1; k2] and b2 = y2[k1;:k2] whenever y1[:k1; k2] + y2[k1;:k2] = Y [k1; k2] .
2It deserves heightened attention that the presence of bargaining should not be mistaken as if we were
invoking any sort of cooperative decision making. As is well known, for instance, Nash bargaining can
be viewed as a limiting solution for Rubinstein’s bargaining, which is in fact a genuinely noncooperative
game and is entirely devoid of any form of cooperative decision making (Rubinstein, 1982).
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Note that our de…nition of regularity implies
sign [y1[k1; k2]¡ y1[:k1; k2]] = sign [y2[k1; k2]¡ y2[k1;:k2]] :
This automatically implies the following general feature.
Proposition 1 : For any regular bargaining function b[¢; ¢; ¢] and nett joint pro…t schedule
Y [¢; ¢] , whenever a solution
n
fyi[k1; k2]gk22f0;1gk12f0;1g
o
i=1;2
exists, it sustains the equilibrium
outcome such that :
² either both …rms contribute or neither …rm contributes if
Y [1; 1] + Y [0; 0] ¸ Y [1; 0] + Y [0; 1] ; (2:1)
² only one of the two …rms contributes if
Y [1; 1] + Y [0; 0] · Y [1; 0] + Y [0; 1] : (2:2)
In words, {contribute, contribute} and {not contribute, not contribute} are equilibrium
outcomes if the nett gains from the two …rms’ contributions are superadditive (as in
inequality (2.1)).3 Otherwise, if the strategic contribution decisions are to yield subad-
ditive nett pro…ts (indicated by inequality (2.2), then {contribute, not contribute} and
{not contribute, contribute} are equilibrium outcomes.4
Economic implication : Proposition 1 implies that, in the prospect of bargaining
between the participant …rms inside the joint project, the equilibria resulting from each
…rm’s “sel…sh” contribution decisions are determined solely on the grounds of super-/sub-
additivity of the nett gains from contributions, not on the grounds of e¢cient outcomes
3Here, we refer to the discrete action version of superadditivity Y [1; 1] ¡ Y [0; 1] ¸ Y [1; 0] ¡ Y [0; 0]
and submodularity Y [1; 1] ¡ Y [0; 1] · Y [1; 0] ¡ Y [0; 0] . In the former, the incentives for (or against)
contribution are supermodular between the two …rms (i.e., one …rm’s incentive to contribute is higher
when the other …rm does likewise than when the other …rm does elsewise). In the latter, these incentives
are submodular.
4Again, the analysis of R&D activity provides well known examples of both subadditivity and super-
additivity, depending upon whether the choice of R&D e¤orts is followed by Cournot or Bertrand compe-
tition (see Brander and Spencer, 1983; Dixon, 1985; Bester and Petrakis, 1993).
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per se. This can be illustrated in …gure 2, where the most e¢cient contribution pro…les
change across thickened borders. They are sustainable through Nash bargaining where
circled, unsustainable where crossed out. For, to the upper-right of the dashed diagonal
the equilibrium pro…les are [1; 0] and [0; 1], to its lower-left they are [1; 1] and [0; 0].
Figure 2 : e¢cient outcomes and their sustainability via Nash bargaining :
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(2b) when Y [1; 1]¡ Y [0; 0] = ° · 0.
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3 Illustrative examples
Probably the most popularly accepted bargaining solution concept is the Nash solution.5
Let the ratio of bargaining power between the two …rms be Ã1 : Ã2 . The two …rms’ nett
pro…t shares when both …rms contribute are determined as
y1[1; 1]¡ y1[0; 1]
Ã1
=
y2[1; 1]¡ y2[1; 0]
Ã2
; y1[1; 1] + y2[1; 1] = Y [1; 1] : (3:1)
In words, …rm 1’s incentive (or disincentive) to “deviate” from contribution (C) to no
contribution (N) should be matched against that for …rm 2, weighted by their respective
5For algebraic simplicity, we treat Nash bargaining as sharing of the nett excess surplus, i.e., the nett
pro…t di¤erential in comparison to the “outside option” available to each …rm, be the excess surplus
positive or negative. The qualitative nature of the game would stand largely una¤ected if we interpreted
it as sharing of a positive excess surplus only, not adopting the same form of solution when the excess
surplus is negative. The latter is technically more intricate but can be plausible depending upon what
sort of economic circumstance is in question (see Appendix A).
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bargaining power.6 Likewise,
y1[1; 0]¡ y1[0; 0]
Ã1
=
y2[1; 0]¡ y2[1; 1]
Ã2
; y1[1; 0] + y2[1; 0] = Y [1; 0] ; (3:2)
y1[0; 1]¡ y1[1; 1]
Ã1
=
y2[0; 1]¡ y2[0; 0]
Ã2
; y1[0; 1] + y2[0; 1] = Y [0; 1] ; (3:3)
y1[0; 0]¡ y1[1; 0]
Ã1
=
y2[0; 0]¡ y2[0; 1]
Ã2
; y1[0; 0] + y2[0; 0] = Y [0; 0] : (3:4)
The above system of eight equations with eight unknowns leaves one degree of freedom
and gives us the general solution
y1[0; 0] + y2[0; 0] = Y [0; 0] ;
y1[1; 1] = y1[0; 0] +
Y [1; 1]¡ Y [1; 0] + Y [0; 1]¡ Y [0; 0]
2
;
y2[1; 1] = y2[0; 0] +
Y [1; 1]¡ Y [0; 1] + Y [1; 0]¡ Y [0; 0]
2
;
y1[1; 0] = y1[0; 0] +
Ã1(Y [0; 1] + Y [1; 0]¡ Y [1; 1]¡ Y [0; 0])
2(Ã1 + Ã2)
;
y2[0; 1] = y2[0; 0] +
Ã2(Y [1; 0] + Y [0; 1]¡ Y [1; 1]¡ Y [0; 0])
2(Ã2 + Ã1)
;
y1[0; 1] = y1[0; 0] +
Ã2(Y [1; 1]¡ Y [1; 0]) + (2Ã1 + Ã2)(Y [0; 1]¡ Y [0; 0])
2(Ã1 + Ã2)
;
y2[1; 0] = y2[0; 0] +
Ã1(Y [1; 1]¡ Y [0; 1]) + (2Ã2 + Ã1)(Y [1; 0]¡ Y [0; 0])
2(Ã2 + Ã1)
:
Example 1 : A priori equal bargaining power Ã1 = Ã2 , the private cost of contri-
bution is £8 million per …rm whilst the gross bene…t from contribution is £10 million if
only one …rm contributes and £24 million if both contribute.
The nett joint return table becomes :
…rm 2 contribute not contribute
…rm 1 contribute Y [1; 1] = 8 Y [1; 0] = 2
not contribute Y [0; 1] = 2 Y [0; 0] = 0
in £ million.
6Again, in our metaphor to Rubinstein’s bargaining and its limiting solution, this corresponds to the
case where the two …rms’ degrees of patience, measured in terms of discount rates r1 and r2 , are in the
ratio r1 : r2 =
1
Ã1
:
1
Ã2
. As we see hereinafter, we introduce these bargaining power parameters for the
sake of completeness, or di¤erently put, to demonstrate that our qualitative results do not hinge upon
the distribution of bargaining power between the participating …rms.
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The nett joint return from a sole …rm’s contribution is £2 million whilst that from an
additional …rm’s contribution is £6 million, whereby nett returns from contribution is
superadditive between the two …rms.
As aforementioned there are a continuum of bargaining solutions, but there is only
one symmetric solution7 (in £ million):
y1[0; 0] = y2[0; 0] = 0 ; y1[1; 0] = y2[0; 1] = ¡1 ;
y1[0; 1] = y2[1; 0] = 3 ; y1[1; 1] = y2[1; 1] = 4:
This entails two pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria (simply “equilibria” hereinafter
unless otherwise speci…ed), in one of which neither …rm contributes, in the other both
…rms contribute and share the pro…t equally. This re‡ects the fact that nett returns
from contribution is superadditive (see Proposition 1 in section 2). Obviously, the latter
equilibrium entails the most e¢cient (…rst best) outcome.
Were there no bargaining, instead if the two …rms were to share the gross pro…t
equally irrespective of their contributions, then the unique equilibrium outcome would be
for neither …rm to contribute. This is due to the classical free riding problem leading to
underincentives for each …rm to contribute. It is hereby concluded that the prospect of
bargaining can help sustain the economically e¢cient outcome.
Example 2 : A priori equal bargaining power Ã1 = Ã2 , the private cost of contri-
bution is £2 million per …rm whilst the gross bene…t from contribution is £10 million if
only one …rm contributes and £16 million if both contribute.
The nett joint return table becomes :
…rm 2 contribute not contribute
…rm 1 contribute Y [1; 1] = 12 Y [1; 0] = 8
not contribute Y [0; 1] = 8 Y [0; 0] = 0
in £ million.
7We list the symmetric solution for nothing but concreteness. The set of equilibrium outcomes would,
of course, be the same whether we selected the symmetric bargaining solution or an asymmetric solution.
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The nett joint return from a sole …rm’s contribution is £8 million whilst that from an
additional …rm’s contribution is £4 million, whereby nett returns from contribution is
subadditive between the two …rms.
The unique symmetric solution (in £ million) is:
y1[0; 0] = y2[0; 0] = 0 ; y1[1; 0] = y2[0; 1] = 1 ;
y1[0; 1] = y2[1; 0] = 7 ; y1[1; 1] = y2[1; 1] = 6 ;
where the equilibria are for only one of the …rms to contribute and take £3 million out
of the gross pro…t of £10 million whilst the other …rm takes the remainder, £7 million,
without making contribution. This is the re‡exion of the subadditivity of nett returns
from contribution.
Obviously, the nett return from contribution is always positive, hence economically
the most e¢cient outcome would be for both …rms to contribute, which is nevertheless
unsustainable through bargaining. Without bargaining, if the two …rms were to split
the gross pro…t always evenly, then the e¢cient outcome would indeed be the unique
equilibrium outcome. In this case, unlike in our previous example, bargaining hinders the
sustainability of economically the most e¢cient outcome.
Example 3 : A priori equal bargaining power Ã1 = Ã2 , the private cost of contri-
bution is nil for …rm 1 and £10 million for …rm 2, whilst the gross bene…t from contribution
is £4 million if only one …rm contributes and £12 million if both contribute.
The nett joint return table is :
…rm 2 contribute not contribute
…rm 1 contribute Y [1; 1] = 2 Y [1; 0] = 4
not contribute Y [0; 1] = ¡6 Y [0; 0] = 0
in £ million.
As this game is a priori asymmetric between the two …rms, there is no “symmetric”
solution. One of the solutions is
y1[0; 0] = y2[0; 0] = 0 ; y1[1; 0] = y2[0; 1] = ¡1 ;
y1[0; 1] = ¡5 ; y2[1; 0] = 5 ; y1[1; 1] = ¡4 ; y2[1; 1] = 6 ;
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which accommodates two equilibria, in one of which neither …rm contributes, in the other
both …rms contribute. Obviously in this case …rm 1’s contribution is uniformly e¢cient
whilst …rm 2’s contribution is uniformly ine¢cient, hence the most e¢cient outcome is
only for …rm 1 not for …rm 2 to contribute. This e¢cient outcome would be sustainable
if gross pro…ts are shared evenly all the time, but is not sustainable with the bargaining
for pro…t sharing schedules.
4 Conclusion
Standard game-theoretic literature has it that, in any jointly undertaken productive
activity, if the pro…t sharing schedule cannot be made contingent upon the level of e¤ort
exerted by each participating …rm and hence each …rm inevitably bears its own e¤ort
costs, then there arises systematic underincentives for e¤orts, entailing lower aggregate
e¤ort than economically e¢cient. This is the classical free riding problem.
What we have shown in this paper is that bargaining over a pro…t sharing schedule that
is contingent upon observed e¤ort exerted by each participating …rm [I] can alleviate the
free riding problem, yet [II] tends to entail a pro…le of e¤ort levels based solely upon the
super-/sub-additivity of nett returns to e¤ort, irrespective of the nett joint productivity of
e¤ort. The latter inevitably implies that [IIa] when nett returns to e¤ort are subadditive,
a …rm’s low e¤ort tends to be traded for another …rm’s high e¤ort even when the joint nett
returns to e¤ort is uniformly positive (in which case the e¢cient outcome of all …rms’ high
e¤ort becomes unsustainable) or when the joint nett returns is uniformly negative (where
the e¢cient outcome would be all …rms’ low e¤ort), and that [IIb] when nett returns to
e¤ort are superadditive, a …rm’s high e¤ort tends to link with another …rm’s high e¤ort,
whereby the system fails to select for an e¢cient …rm against an ine¢cient …rm.
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Appendix A
The alternative, technically more intricate, scenario is that …rms must follow Nash solution
only if each …rm’s excess surplus share is positive. The system of equations (3.1) through
(3.4) is now replaced with :
y1[1; 1]¡ y1[0; 1]
Ã1
=
y2[1; 1]¡ y2[1; 0]
Ã2
if y1[1; 1]+y2[1; 1] = Y [1; 1] ¸ y1[0; 1]+ y2[1; 0] ;
y1[1; 0]¡ y1[0; 0]
Ã1
=
y2[1; 0]¡ y2[1; 1]
Ã2
if y1[1; 0]+y2[1; 0] = Y [1; 0] ¸ y1[0; 0]+ y2[1; 1] ;
y1[0; 1]¡ y1[1; 1]
Ã1
=
y2[0; 1]¡ y2[0; 0]
Ã2
if y1[0; 1]+y2[0; 1] = Y [0; 1] ¸ y1[1; 1]+ y2[0; 0] ;
y1[0; 0]¡ y1[1; 0]
Ã1
=
y2[0; 0]¡ y2[0; 1]
Ã2
if y1[0; 0]+y2[0; 0] = Y [0; 0] ¸ y1[1; 0]+ y2[0; 1] :
It is intuitively clear that this leads to the same equilibrium result as in Proposition 1,
although the exact set of sustainable solutions can now have one more degree of freedom
than in section 2 (that is, two degrees of freedom in total).
Appendix B
Our basic analysis in section 2 can be straightforwardly extended to a descrete contri-
butions space. Assume now that each of the two …rms has a trinary, as opposed to the
previously binary, choice of contributing either 0, 1, or 2 units to the jointly undertaken
project. The nett joint returns table now becomes as follows.
…rm 2 2 units 1 unit 0 units
2 units Y [2; 2] Y [2; 1] Y [2; 0]
…rm 1 1 unit Y [1; 2] Y [1; 1] Y [1; 0]
0 units Y [0; 2] Y [0; 1] Y [0; 0]
Accordingly, our concept of regularity needs to be rede…ned as follows.
Rede…nition : A bargaining function b[¢; ¢; ¢] = (b1[¢; ¢; ¢]; b2[¢; ¢; ¢]) :
y1[k1; k2] = b1 [max y1[:k1; k2];max y2[k1;:k2]; Y [k1; k2]] ;
y2[k1; k2] = b2 [max y1[:k1; k2];max y2[k1;:k2]; Y [k1; k2]] ;
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where
max y1[:k1; k2] ´ max fy1[k²1 ; k2]; y1[k±1 ; k2]g fk1; k²1; k±1g = f0; 1; 2g ;
max y2[k1;:k2] ´ max fy2[k1; k²2 ]; y1[k1; k±2 ]g fk2; k²2; k±2g = f0; 1; 2g ;
is said to be regular if
² b1 increases in maxy1[:k1; k2] , decreases in maxy2[k1;:k2] , and increases in Y [k1; k2] ;
² b2 decreases in maxy1[:k1; k2] , increases in maxy2[k1;:k2] , and increases in Y [k1; k2] ;
² b1 = max y1[:k1; k2] and b2 = max y2[k1;:k2] whenevermax y1[:k1; k2]+max y2[k1;:k2] =
Y [k1; k2] .
Our interest is not in an exhaustive equilibrium comparative statics result on this game,
but instead in the following analogue of our foregoing Proposition 1 (see section 2).8
Proposition 2 :
² The two …rms’ contributing the same number of units, either 0, 1, or 2 units each,
is an equilibrium outcome if
Y [2; 2] + Y [1; 1] ¸ Y [2; 1] + Y [1; 2] ; (B:1)
Y [2; 2] + Y [0; 0] ¸ Y [2; 0] + Y [0; 2] ; (B:2)
Y [1; 1] + Y [0; 0] ¸ Y [1; 0] + Y [0; 1] : (B:3)
² The two …rms’ contributing two units altogether, be it split 2-0 or 1-1, is an
equilibrium outcome if
Y [2; 0] + Y [1; 1] ¸ Y [2; 1] + Y [0; 1] ; (B:4)
Y [2; 0] + Y [0; 2] ¸ Y [2; 2] + Y [0; 0] ; (B:5)
Y [1; 1] + Y [0; 2] ¸ Y [1; 0] + Y [1; 2] : (B:6)
8Note that Proposition 2, unlike Proposition 1, does not exhaust the entire feasible range of parameter
values Y [¢; ¢] . For instance, it is possible that inequality (B.1) may be satis…ed whilst inequalities (B.2) and
(B.3) may be violated. Our intention here is to focus on those two cases listed speci…cally on Proposition
2, as these two are the relevant cases hereinafter.
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Namely, when the nett gains from the two …rms’ contributions are superadditive in the
sense of positive a¢liation (as in (B.1) through (B.3)) the two …rms’ equilibrium contri-
butions are strategically perfectly complementary; otherwise when the nett gains are
subadditive (as in (B.4) through (B.6)) the equilibrium contributions are strategically
perfectly substitutable between the two …rms.
The reason why these two “extreme” cases appeal to our interest is because they enable
us to extrapolate our analysis further to a continuous contributions space. An analogue
of Propositions 1 and 2 is as below.
Proposition 3 :
² The two …rms’ e¤ort levels k1; k2 are complementary along the locus of equilibria if
@2Y [k1; k2]
@k1 @k2
> 0 ;
² The two …rms’ e¤ort levels k1; k2 are substitutional along the locus of equilibria if
@2Y [k1; k2]
@k1 @k2
< 0.
14
References
Bester, H. and E. Petrakis (1993), “The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Di¤erentiated
Industry”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11, 519-34.
Brander, J. and B. Spencer (1983), “Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric
Case”, Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 225-35.
d’Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin (1988), “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in
Duopoly with Spillovers”, American Economic Review, 78, 1133-7.
Dixon, H.D. (1985), “Strategic Investment in a Competitive Industry”, Journal of Indus-
trial Economics, 33, 205-12.
EC Commission (1990), Competition Law in the European Communities, Volume I,
Rules Applicable to Undertakings, Brussels-Luxembourg, EC Commission.
Goto, A. and R. Wakasugi (1988), “Technology Policy”, in Komiya, R., M. Okuno and
K. Suzumura (eds.), Industrial Policy of Japan, New York, Academic Press.
Kamien, M., E. Muller and I. Zang (1992), “Cooperative Joint Ventures and R&D
Cartels”, American Economic Review, 82, 1293-1306.
Katz, M.L. (1986), “An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 17, 527-43.
Katz, M.L. and J.A. Ordover (1990), “R&D Cooperation and Competition”, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 0, Special Issue, 137-91.
Rubinstein, A. (1982), “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, 50,
97-109.
Suzumura, K. (1992), “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with
Spillovers”, American Economic Review, 82, 1307-20.
15
